Previous research on political stereotypes has focused on the perceived moral values or political attitudes of conservatives and liberals. The current studies examined whether laypeople hold stereotypes about the psychological traits of Republicans and Democrats, and whether those stereotypes represent exaggerations of actual political differences. Participants completed measures of epistemic (Study 1), existential (Study 2), and ideological (Study 2) motives. Participants also completed these measures based on how they thought the average Republican and average Democrat would respond. Consistent with previous research, Republicans scored higher on these measures of motivated social cognition than Democrats. Critically, political stereotypes about Democrats and Republicans mirrored, but exaggerated, the actual differences. Despite an overall tendency of participants to engage in stereotype exaggeration, Democrats engaged in greater stereotype exaggeration compared to Republicans, and partisans (individuals who strongly identified with either party) engaged in greater stereotype exaggeration compared to more moderate party members.
.
The current studies were designed to test whether stereotypes exist regarding the psychological traits of Republicans and Democrats, and whether there are moderators of these stereotypes. To accomplish this we utilized an in-group-out-group design, in which participants respond to items as themselves and as an "average" or "typical" member of the in-group and outgroup (see Judd & Park, 1993) . We used this design to measure the extent to which individuals believe Republicans and Democrats possess traits associated with each set of social-cognitive motives from the "conservatism as motivated social cognition" framework (Jost et al., 2003a;  2009): epistemic motives (Study 1), existential motives (Study 2), and ideological motives (Study 2). We hypothesized that political stereotypes would manifest as exaggerations of actual group differences, as opposed to inaccurate beliefs regarding group differences (see Jussim, Harber, Crawford, Cain, & Cohen, 2005; McCauley, 1995) . The study design also allowed us to test whether political stereotypes are moderated by political party affiliation and political extremity. For reasons we will discuss below, it was plausible that these variables would moderate stereotype exaggeration.
In each study, we wanted to answer five research questions related to political stereotypes. First, do stereotypes exist regarding the psychological traits of Republicans and Democrats? Second, do these stereotypes reflect actual directional differences on these psychological traits? Third, are these stereotypes exaggerations of actual group differences?
Fourth, are there ideological group differences in the expression of political stereotypes? The "rigidity-of-the-right" account might predict that the psychological traits that differentiate conservatives and liberals are precisely the ones that could cause conservatives to exhibit more F o r P e e r R e v i e w Political Stereotypes 4 exaggerated stereotypes than liberals. Because conservatives tend to view things more rigidly and favor certainty more than liberals, conservatives might also be more likely to exaggerate differences between conservatives and liberals to enhance feelings of certainty. Work on general prejudice (e.g., Sears & Henry, 2003; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996; Whitley, 1999) and perceptions of differences in political beliefs (Judd & Park, 1993 . Robinson et al., 1995 provides additional empirical support for the hypothesis that conservatives might demonstrate increased stereotype exaggeration compared to liberals (although see Chambers et al., 2013 , for an alternate explanation of the prejudice results). Fifth, does extremity of political affiliation increase political stereotype exaggeration? The rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis has received more attention in the literature, but some researchers maintain that political extremity, not group membership, results in increased cognitive rigidity (see Greenberg & Jonas, 2003; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003b , for a debate between the two perspectives). Despite the limited amount of research on political stereotypes, some of the research on perceptions of political attitudes differences Chambers & Melnyk, 2006) provides support for the hypothesis that partisans of both parties will demonstrate increased stereotype exaggeration compared to more moderate party members.
Study 1: Epistemic Motives
The first study was designed to test whether individuals perceive differences in the extent to which Republicans and Democrats are motivated to reduce uncertainty. The specific measure of epistemic motives to reduce uncertainty used in Study 1 was need for cognitive closure (NFCC), the desire to quickly achieve and maintain certainty (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) .
Previous research has demonstrated that conservatives tend to be higher in NFCC than liberals (see Jost et al., 2003a 
Measures
Need for cognitive closure. NFCC was measured using the NFCC Scale (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) in which participants made responses using a scale ranging from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (6).
Political party affiliation and extremity. Participants completed two items used to measure political party affiliation in the American National Election Studies (www.electionstudies.org), which first measures whether the individual identifies as a Democrat, Independent/Other party, or Republican and then measures the strength (strong or not very strong) of their affiliation (for self-identified Democrats and Republicans) or whether they lean towards the Republican Party, Democratic Party, or neither party (for self-identified Independents/Other). The responses to these two items allow the creation of a 7-point measure of political party affiliation from "Strong Democrat" (-3) to "Strong Republican" (3), with Independent (0) as the midpoint. Political extremity was calculated by taking the absolute value of the political party affiliation item. Consequently, larger numbers represent more extreme political party affiliation (range is 0 to 3).
Perceptions of political groups. Participants indicated the perceived political ideology (7-point verbal scale ranging from Extremely liberal to Extremely conservative), need to compromise (5-point verbal scale ranging from Compromise much less to Compromise much more), and likeability (7-point verbal scale ranging from Dislike Extremely to Like Extremely) of 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 
Results and Discussion
To better communicate how the results of the current study answer each of the five research questions, each question will be restated followed by the relevant results.
1) Do stereotypes regarding political psychological differences exist?
Yes. Participants perceived Republicans to be higher in NFCC (M = 4.47, SD = 0.60) than Democrats (M = 3.58, SD = 0.58), t(203) = 14.26, p < .001, d = 1.00.
2) Do these stereotypes reflect actual differences?
Yes. Republicans reported being more motivated by NFCC (M = 4.09, SD = 0.45) than Democrats (M = 3.62, SD = 0.45), t(116) = 5.44 p < .001, d = 1.04 (see grey line in Figure 1 ). 
3) Are these stereotypes exaggerations of actual group differences?
Yes. For each participant, we calculated a perceived-spread score by subtracting the participant's mean NFCC response as the "average Democrat" from the participant's mean NFCC response as the "average Republican." A one-sample t-test revealed that these perceivedspread scores (M = 0.89) tended to be higher than the test value of 0.48, which was the mean for the actual spread (i.e., the actual difference in NFCC scores between Republicans and Democrats), t(203) = 6.58, p < .001, d = .47 (see Figure 2 ).
It is noteworthy that Democrats and Republicans are not misperceived to the same degree. For each participant, we calculated an exaggeration-about-Democrats score by subtracting the actual NFCC mean of Democrats in the sample from the participant's mean 
4) Does party affiliation moderate the expression of stereotype exaggeration?
Yes. Party affiliation was significantly correlated with the perceived-spread score, r (202) = -0.20, p = .005, meaning that increased Democratic Party affiliation was associated with increased exaggeration of the perceived differences between Republicans and Democrats. This increased exaggeration among Democrats can be seen in Figure 1 in the larger slope of the line for Democratic participants responding as the "average Republican" and "average Democrat" (blue dashed-line) compared to the slopes of the lines for Republican participants (red dottedline) and the actual NFCC means of Republicans and Democrats (grey solid-line).
5) Does extremity of party affiliation lead to increased exaggeration?
Yes. Political extremity was marginally correlated with the perceived-spread score, r(202) = 0.12, p = .08, meaning that increased identification with one's political party was associated with increased exaggeration of the perceived differences between Republicans and Democrats. This increased exaggeration among partisans is evident in the increased slope of the line for partisan respondents compared to moderate respondents in Figure 3 . A regression scales. Participants completed all three scales from a given viewpoint before moving on to the next viewpoint. There were no significant order effects (ps > .65), so order will not be discussed further.
Results and Discussion
The measures in Study 2 were calculated via the same methods as Study 1.
1) Do stereotypes regarding political psychological differences exist?
Yes. Participants perceived Republicans to be higher than Democrats on all three traits 
2) Do these stereotypes reflect actual differences?
Yes. Republicans reported higher BDW, t (109 
3) Are these stereotypes exaggerations of actual group differences?
Yes. One-sample t-tests revealed that the perceived-spread between Republicans and Democrats were larger than the actual spread between Republicans and Democrats on all three traits (BDW, t (208 Republicans and Democrats was primarily the result of participants overestimating the extent to which Republicans possess BDW, SDO, and SJ.
4) Does party affiliation moderate the expression of stereotype exaggeration?
Yes. Political party affiliation was significantly correlated with the perceived-spread scores for BDW, r(208) = -0.31, p < .001, and SDO, r(208) = -0.41, p < .001, but not SJ, r (208) = -0.01, p = .89, meaning increased Democratic Party affiliation was associated with increased exaggeration of the perceived differences between Republicans and Democrats on BDW and SDO. This increased exaggeration among Democrats can be seen in Figure 1 in the larger slope of the line for Democratic participants responding as the "average Republican" and "average
Democrat" compared to the slopes of the lines for Republican participants and the actual means of Republicans and Democrats.
5) Does extremity of party affiliation lead to increased exaggeration?
Yes. Political extremity was significantly correlated with the perceived-spread scores for BDW, r(208) = 0.15, p = .03, and SDO, r(208) = 0.14, p = .05, but not SJ, r(208) = -0.05, p = .50, meaning increased affiliation with one's political party was associated with increased exaggeration of the perceived differences between Republicans and Democrats on BDW and SDO. This increased exaggeration among partisans is evident in the increased slope of the line for partisan respondents compared to moderate respondents in The current studies were designed to answer five questions regarding the existence of political stereotypes for psychological differences between conservatives and liberals. The answers to the first two questions (Do psychological political stereotypes exist? Do they reflect actual differences?) are a resounding "Yes." For all four of the individual difference measuresNeed for Cognitive Closure, Belief in a Dangerous World, Social Dominance Orientation, and System Justification -individuals gave higher responses when responding as the "average Republican" than when responding as the "average Democrat." These stereotypes reflect the direction of actual differences, with Republicans in the sample actually having higher mean responses on these scales compared to Democrats in the sample, results consistent with numerous other studies (see Jost et al., 2003a) . However, the perceived differences between Republicans and Democrats on these trait measures were significantly larger than the actual differences, answering the third question of whether these psychological political stereotypes represent exaggerations of actual group differences. These exaggerations of group differences were driven by the fact that for all four traits, participants exhibited greater exaggeration when responding as the "average Republican" and less exaggeration when responding as the "average Democrat". We interpret the above results to reflect the fact that stereotypes are susceptible to both motivational and cognitive sources of bias. Factors, such as social identity concerns (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979), should motivate Democrats and partisans to differentiate Democrats from Republicans on "conservative" traits, which may be a source of the larger stereotype exaggeration about Republicans that was observed in the current studies. On a related note, one possible source of cognitive bias may be that the traits used in the current studies are more associated with conservatives. In other words, individuals may exhibit greater stereotype 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Returning to our enumerated research questions, the fourth and fifth research questions asked whether the expression of political stereotypes might be moderated by political affiliation or extremity. The results of the current studies suggest that Democrats and partisans of both political parties were more likely to express stronger political stereotypes for most of the traits. It is not too surprising that Democrats might stereotype Republicans, but the results also suggest that partisan Republicans have stronger stereotypes about Republicans as well. The willingness of partisan Republicans to stereotype fellow Republicans may depend on the flexibility a trait can be interpreted. For example, while liberals may view a need to achieve and maintain certainty as being overly rigid and narrow-minded, conservatives may view it as simply being principled or willing to "make the tough decisions" efficiently, which may make partisans from both parties more willing to stress differences on this trait. Regardless of the cause, the results of the current studies suggest that future research should examine both political extremity and affiliation when examining potential moderation of political stereotype effects.
General Discussion
One limitation of the current study was that the sample was not a nationally representative sample. That being said, the political distribution of our studies were roughly equal to those at the national-level. According to the most recent Gallup Poll (Gallup, 2014), 31% of Americans identify as Democrats (35.3% in Study 1, 35.6% in Study 2), 25% identify as While political stereotypes have now been documented, it is unclear the extent to which political stereotypes influence evaluations and behavior. Unlike traditional stereotypes, political stereotypes and prejudice may be more socially acceptable to express, at least in politically homogenous environments (see Inbar & Lammers, 2012 , for how this is manifest in social and personality psychology). If individuals feel like their political stereotypes are valid and feel no need to inhibit the expression of these stereotypes, individuals might be more likely to act on these stereotypes. Additionally, acting on stereotypes could lead to the creation of self-fulfilling prophesies (e.g., Snyder and Swann, 1978) . For example, a Democrat, assuming his Republican co-worker is close-minded, might more actively advocate his position, leading his coworker to become more defensive and further entrenched in her position. Future research should examine the impact of political stereotypes on evaluations of political out-group members and utilize interaction paradigms that have been used in examining traditional forms of stereotypes, such as racial stereotypes, to assess the extent to which political stereotypes influence behavior towards political out-group members.
Conclusion
The current studies reveal that lay people hold political stereotypes-exaggerations of actual group differences-regarding psychological differences between members of the two major U.S. political parties. Specifically, these stereotypes seemed to be driven by an overestimation of the extent to which Republicans possess traits linked to epistemic, existential, and ideological motives. While Democrats seem to have especially exaggerated perceptions of Republicans, there was also evidence that partisans from both ends of the political spectrum exhibited greater stereotype exaggeration. Drawing attention to and continuing to study this unique form of stereotyping could help in the development of effective means of reducing some of the partisanship that is leading to political ineffectiveness in government and ease some of the animosity among average citizens for members of political out-groups. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   F  o  r  P  e  e  r  R  e  v  i  e  w 21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   F  o  r  P  e  e  r  R  e  v  i  e  w 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58 Note. The colored lines represent the mean responses for when Democrats (blue dashed-line) and Republicans (red dotted-line) answered as the "average Democrat" or "average Republican." Responses for Independents/Other are not included for ease of presentation. Party affiliation of raters based on the categorical party affiliation item. Grey lines are included to show the location of actual group means. Specifically, the left end of the line reflects the mean of Democrats' actual scores and the right end of the line reflects the mean of Republicans' actual scores. Note. Solid grey lines represent actual group means for Democrats and Republicans, and dotted lines represent the mean responses indicated for moderates (black dashed-line; extremity score of 0) and partisans (grey dashed-line; extremity score of 3) answering as the "average Democrat (Republican)." Error bars represent standard errors. In addition to the perceived need of the two parties to compromise, the perceived ideological extremity and liking of the two parties were also predictive of trait exaggerations about Republicans relative to Democrats. We report analyses for these variables below.
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Republicans for NFCC, BDW, and SDO relative to the exaggeration about Democrats on these measures might be a consequence, at least partially, of participants perceiving the Republican Party as more extreme and less likeable than the Democratic Party. To examine the extent to which perceived need to compromise, ideological extremity, and liking independently predict the difference scores regarding trait exaggeration for the four traits, separate regressions were run regressing the differences in the three potential mediators on the difference scores regarding trait exaggeration for each trait. Before describing the results of these regressions, it is worth noting that the correlations between the difference scores in need to compromise (n), perceived ideological extremity (i), and liking (l) were moderate to large in 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
